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Responding to the key challenge of organisedcrime, President Thabo Mbeki in 1999launched the Directorate of Special
Operations (DSO), otherwise known as the
Scorpions. Given that prosecutors are central to the
Scorpions’ prosecution-led approach, the DSO was
located in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).
The DSO began its work in 2001 after almost three
years of setting up the institutional architecture of
what, in the eyes of the public, soon became South
Africa’s exemplary crime-busting agency.
Despite positive public perception, the Scorpions
have had a turbulent life since they started
operating. The overlap of their work and that of the
South African Police Service (SAPS), as well as
problems arising from their mandate, has led to
boiling tensions between political principals and
senior bureaucrats responsible for security agencies.
The investigation of high-profile politicians by the
Scorpions, the DSO’s aggressive media strategy and
what some perceived to be an abuse of power,
provoked negative reactions from a range of
political actors. It is against this background that
President Mbeki appointed Judge Sisi Khampepe on
1 April 2005 to head a commission of enquiry
(known as the Khampepe Commission) to review
the mandate and location of the DSO and make
recommendations. 
The Khampepe Commission has come and gone; it
has made recommendations and submitted its
report to the President. After consulting the National
Security Council (NSC) and Cabinet, the President
made a decision in June 2006, and the wheels of
implementation are currently turning. Yet, there is
little public understanding of the meaning and
implications of the decision for the agencies
concerned and on the future effectiveness of the
Scorpions. This article is an attempt to shed light on
the decision. 
Reporting to two political principals – will it work?  
That the Scorpions had become a political hot
potato became clear long before the Khampepe
Commission was appointed. Senior politicians
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within the ruling African National Congress (ANC)
made conflicting statements in relation to the DSO,
with some accusing it of employing ‘Hollywood
tactics’ in its handling of cases. In an attempt to
make sense of the divergent positions presented to
the Commission by government bureaucrats and
ministers, the political divide with regard to the
Scorpions has been summed up as follows:
… because the bureaucrats and Ministers
involved were all senior members of the
ANC, it could be suggested that they
mirrored a schism within the ruling party
regarding the future of the Scorpions. Other
observers may construe it to suggest that
those from within the ANC who were for the
relocation of the Scorpions saw the DSO as
a loose dog in need of taming, while those
who favoured the status quo viewed the
Scorpions as an important instrument
through which to weed out corrupt
comrades.1
Indeed, the division within the ANC also extended
to the general South African public; some wanting
the Scorpions to be relocated to the SAPS, and
others preferring the DSO to remain within the
NPA. This presented a daunting political challenge
to President Mbeki: how to accommodate the
wishes of two diametrically opposed camps within
his own party and outside. Here is the president’s
decision:
Cabinet has endorsed the NSC’s decision to
accept in principle the recommendations of
the Commission, including the matter of
retaining the DSO with the NPA and that its
law enforcement responsibilities shall be
subject to political oversight by the Minister
of Safety and Security.2
This decision should not be misconstrued to mean a
complete relocation of political responsibility to the
Ministry of Safety and Security (MSS). The retention
of the Scorpions within the NPA means that they
will continue to report to the Ministry of Justice and
Constitutional Development (MJ&CD) on matters
outside the law enforcement work of the DSO.
Politically, the decision splits the Scorpions; the law
enforcement function becomes the responsibility of
the MSS while prosecutions remain within the
ambit of the MJ&CD.
Located within the context of the political divisions
in the ANC, the decision is a crafty political tactic
by the President to quieten both camps. Those
who are for the status quo have reason to celebrate
that the Scorpions remain in the NPA, even though
they also have to report to the MSS. But the fact
that they have to report to the MSS provides solace
to those who called for the entire relocation of the
DSO. The political content of this decision could
therefore be interpreted as a win-win situation. 
Furthermore, President Mbeki deserves credit for
passing the Khampepe Commission report through
the NSC and Cabinet before making a decision.
This has, at least for now, silenced potential
deviant voices from within. It would appear as
though the President borrowed a leaf from Lord
Melbourne’s book of political philosophy: “I do
not care what the members of the Cabinet say as
long as they all say the same thing outside.”3
However, only time can tell how long President
Mbeki’s colleagues in Cabinet will say the same
thing regarding the decision on the Scorpions.
Perhaps the more difficult question is: If they start
saying different things in public, as they did before
and during the Khampepe Commission, are
stakeholders again going to be invited to make
presentations before another commission of
inquiry on how to get out of the political
quagmire?
Politics versus operational efficiency?
The recommendations made by Judge Khampepe
and endorsed by the President state, among others,
that:
prosecutors who work for the DSO … [are
to] continue to receive instructions and be
accountable to the National Director of
Public Prosecutions (NDPP). The NDPP, in
turn, … [will] remain accountable to the
Minster of Justice and Constitutional
Development as currently provided for in
law.4
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It is important to read this decision bearing in mind
that “Cabinet reaffirmed the architecture and
practice of the DSO” that relates to the prosecution-
led approach. The key question is whether, on a
practical level, it is that easy to separate the law
enforcement work of the DSO (which relates to
investigators) from its prosecutorial responsibilities
(which relates to prosecutors).
It is useful to understand how the prosecution-led
approach works in practice. When a specific case is
under consideration, an investigator(s), analyst(s)
and prosecutor(s) (all from within the DSO) sit
around the table to collectively deal with it, with
the prosecutor leading the process. The investigator
places pieces of evidence with the analysts, who
then consider crime intelligence or other
implications arising from existing evidence. As the
leader of the process, the prosecutor advises both
the investigator and the analyst on aspects of the
case needing revalidation or further investigation, in
order to build a formidable legal case that can stand
the test of law in court.
What subsequently goes to court is the culmination
of the investigative and analytical work of the team,
satisfying the legal requirements as determined by
the prosecutor. So, if any person expects a
comprehensive report on how a specific case was
built, the prosecutor is the person to contact since
s/he leads the process with the view to ensuring
conviction in court. It would, therefore, be a
mistake to expect the investigator or the analyst to
give a complete picture of a case since these two
only deal with certain aspects of DSO cases.
Regarding political reporting, the head of the
Scorpions reports to the National Director of Public
Prosecutions (head of the NPA), who in turn reports
to the minister concerned. With the new
arrangements, the NPA head will be expected to
report to the MJ&CD and MSS. The complexity of
the Cabinet decision is that it is based on the
assumption that drawing a line between the
investigative and prosecutorial aspects of the work
of the DSO is a clear-cut exercise. 
But as shown above, cases are not always that
straightforward, especially when a prosecution-led
approach is followed. Investigative and
prosecutorial issues often interweave. The NPA
head, preparing a political briefing for the Minister
of Justice or for the Minister of Safety and Security,
may in some cases merely need to reproduce a
single report for both ministers. 
The bigger political question is: What exactly is the
role of the Minister of Safety and Security in
relation to the DSO? The Minister does not decide
which SAPS cases to investigate or not. Such
decisions are made at an operational level. Fears
that the Minister would in this regard dictate terms
to the DSO are without precedent. It should also be
remembered that, even when cases are initiated
and handled by the SAPS, the NPA has the final
word as to whether there is a case to be made in
court or not. At best, the Minister may seek an
explanation on the specifics of a case if he has an
interest in it. He cannot even determine the budget
for the ‘law enforcement aspects’ of the DSO’s
work, since operationally the DSO remains in the
NPA. The DSO’s budget will continue to come from
the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional
Development through the NPA. 
Also related to the role of the Minister of Safety and
Security is the decision that:
the capacity of relevant entities within the
SAPS should be enhanced, for example, by
investing them with the same legal powers
as the DSO and co-locating prosecutors
with its investigators and analysts.5
Here the Minister has some leverage, since he can
bargain for more financial resources from Treasury.
However, the question is whether the SAPS can
accommodate prosecutors in this way. The problem
is not money, but whether the SAPS can be a home
for prosecutors. In its submission to the Khampepe
Commission, the Institute for Security Studies
advised:
Police agencies, the world over, find it
difficult to accommodate civilians because
‘cop culture’ (as often called), like all
organisational cultures, is exclusive.6
The words of the SAPS National Commissioner may
hold a clue to the position of police leadership on
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this issue: “The South African Police Service is not
at all in favour of a prosecution-led approach”.
Given this, one may well ask whether the Cabinet
decision is going to be implemented.
Improving coordination: will we learn from the
past?
While the wisdom and spirit of the decision on
improving coordination is welcome, questions arise
on how the measures decided on will work in
practice. 
It has been decided that a “coordinating committee
of officials”7 will be established to handle
operational issues and advise the Ministerial
Coordinating Committee (MCC).8 However, there
has always been a need for interdepartmental
dialogue involving senior officials from security
agencies. More importantly, the Scorpions cannot
be effective without the cooperation of the police
and other relevant government agencies. The value
of the decision to create a committee of officials
perhaps lies in imposing an obligation on the
officials concerned to work together in dealing with
matters relating to the DSO.
But a policy-driven responsibility does not
automatically guarantee compliance. It remains to
be seen how the creation of a subcommittee will
resolve personal differences that have hindered
cooperation among the same officials in the past. 
While it makes sense for officials to deal with
operational issues, it should be remembered that
operational problems were among the issues that
pushed the Scorpions into the centre of political
turbulence that led to the institution of the
Khampepe Commission. Consider, for example,
how the raids by the Scorpions on Jacob Zuma’s
house became a serious political affair. 
When operational issues induce political interest,
politics and operations become blurred, as do the
responsibilities between ministers and officials. It is
against this background that the proposals of the
NSC directors general, as mandated by Cabinet,
should be awaited with keen interest.9
Realistically, to assume that politics would not
creep into a committee of officials is to ignore
history. The case of the former NIA director general
differing with his political principal before the
Khampepe Commission, and that of the current
head of the NPA differing with his minister at the
same Commission, tell a story of officials embroiled
in politics. That the officials have in the past locked
horns on similar issues is also common knowledge.  
Bearing in mind that Justice Minister Bridget
Mabandla described differences among her MCC
colleagues as irreconcilable, it will be interesting to
see how the ministers sitting on the MCC develop
new relationships. In this regard, her exact words
are worth citing:
My view is that it is highly unlikely that the
situation will improve, notwithstanding
possible suggested remedies that can be
considered.10
The fact that the same ministers who had
irreconcilable differences in the past are now
expected to work together better, is indeed
intriguing. ‘What did not work in the past will work
in future’ seems to be the guiding formula in this
instance – but with no measure of success as yet.
The impact on the fight against crime
What does this decision mean for the fight against
crime? Cabinet’s reaffirmation that “the DSO deal
with high level priority crimes and that it should
deal with cases referred to it by the police” is likely
to generate confusion between the SAPS and the
Scorpions. On the one hand, the DSO will
sometimes feel justified to initiate and handle cases
they deem serious and of high priority. On the other
hand, the SAPS may at times feel that a specific
case should not be handled by the Scorpions or
should have been referred to the DSO by the SAPS. 
One can only hope that the proposals by the NSC
DGs will also provide guidance on who shall be
the final arbiter and on what arbitration would be
based in a scenario like the above. If these issues
are not clarified, criminals will be the victors while
the Scorpions and the SAPS are in a tug of war over
cases.
The reality is that before the President’s decision is
implemented no degree of certainty can be
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President’s decision on both the effectiveness of the
Scorpions and the general fight against crime,
particularly organised crime. What is clear, though,
is that the question arising from the decision can
only be answered in the course of implementing
the decision. It would therefore not be surprising
that the issues that currently seem clear will in the
future have to be revisited.
Endnotes
1 P Mashele, The Khampepe Commission: The future of 
the Scorpions at Stake, ISS Paper, No. 126, June 2006,
p 7.
2 Presidency, Media statement on the report of the 
Khampepe Commission of inquiry, 29 June 2006, p 3.
3 Lord Morrison of Lambeth, P.C., C.H. (1962) British 
Parliamentary Democracy, London: Asia Publishing
House, p 13.
4 Presidency, Ibid, p 2.
5 Op cit.
6 Institute for Security Studies, Oral submission to the 
Khampepe Commission, undated, p 5.
7 Presidency, op cit. The decision states that it should 
be officials with the requisite level of authority to
make decisions, implying Directors General or their
representatives.
8 The MCC was established on the basis of Section 31 
of the National Prosecutions Authority Act, as
amended.
9 Cabinet “charged the Directors General (DGs) of the 
NSC … to develop proposals that will specifically
enable the government to implement” its decisions on
the future of the Scorpions. See Press statement by the
Presidency, op cit. 
10 B S Mabandla, response to the request for further 
particulars by Khampepe Commission, 10 October
2006.
11 Presidency, Ibid. p 1.
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 17 SEPTEMBER 2006 29
attached to any prognosis regarding the impact of
the decision on the general fight against crime.
Many variables exist to influence the situation. 
How firm the Scorpions will be in their future
handling of high profile cases is another question to
which only time will provide the answer. And to
what extent will the SAPS curtail the work of the
Scorpions by evoking Cabinet’s decision that the
Scorpions should deal with cases referred to them
by the SAPS? And, importantly, will the Ministry of
Safety and Security’s new partial political
responsibility be exercised in a manner that
hampers the effectiveness of the DSO?
What about the “concern expressed with regard to
the manner in which the DSO publicised the
subject matter of some of its investigations”?11 Does
this not imply a ‘media gag’ on the DSO, and will it
not have a negative impact on public perception? It
is indeed true that the apparent positive public
perceptions of the Scorpions to a large extent derive
from the over-publicising of the DSO’s work
through the media. In this regard, it is problematic
for the Scorpions to involve the media when raids
and arrests are made, before a conviction is
secured. The impression created by this process is
that the suspect involved is guilty even before a
court of law so pronounces. 
Conclusion
While the decision to split political responsibility
for the Scorpions seems to have generated less
controversy than some would have expected, it
remains to be seen whether the decision can stand
the force of a political turbulence such as the one
that led to the institution of the Khampepe
Commission. The assumption that the DSO’s work
can neatly be divided into law enforcement and
prosecutions, calls for further clarification. Such
clarity would provide important guidance on how
the Scorpions will in future report to two political
principals.
The fact that the measures decided on to improve
coordination between the DSO, the SAPS and other
security agencies include those that did not work in
the past raises more questions than answers. Further
questions also arise as to the full impact of the
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